

# *NEBraskaCERT Conference 2003*

## Effective Oracle Auditing by Aaron Grothe (CISSP)



# Overview

- Why Audit?
  - Why Not Audit?
  - How to Audit
  - How NOT to Audit
  - Basics
  - Where my company is at in our Oracle auditing
  - Summary
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# *Why Audit?*

- We already have a “firewall/ids/os audit package/single sign on/magic beans”
  - Most company networks aren't that well segmented once you are inside you have full access
  - An audit trail can help with troubleshooting database issues
  - An audit trail can be useful when reconstructing a database
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# *Why Not Audit?*

- Audit can be slow – typical auditing should result in a 5% database impact, depending on what you audit of course this can be MUCH higher
  - A poorly implemented audit policy can lead to a false sense of security
  - If an audit policy is implemented poorly it can forever prevent the ability to implement an audit policy
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# *How to Audit*

- Incremental
- Build on Goals
- Regularly “truncate” audit trails do not delete
- Work with Security Officer
- Size tables appropriately



# *How NOT to Audit*

- All or nothing
- Regularly “delete” audit table entries or better yet don't



# *Auditing at the O/S level versus the Database Level*

- If you are using syslog-ng and have an audit policy already defined for dealing with audits that may be a good fit
  - Aggregation of results between multiple Databases is possible with O/S level auditing
  - O/S level auditing is different between Operating Systems and not all functionality is the same
  - Does DBA have access to O/S audit trail
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# Examples

- Based on Pete Finnigan's website, paper and the O'reilly book
    - Showing connection attempts
    - Failed log-on attempts
    - Failed log-on attempts with return codes
    - Attempts to access the database with non-existent users
    - Attempts to access the database at unusual hours
    - Users accessing database accounts from multiple locations
    - Multiple users accessing database from same location
    - Objects being created or Changed
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# Showing connection attempts

- Select username, terminal, action\_name, to\_char(timestamp, 'DDMMYYYY:HHMISS') timestamp, to\_char(logoff\_time, 'DDMMYYYY:HHMISS') logoff\_time, returncode \*from dba\_audit\_session

## Output

Username	Timestamp
Terminal	Logoff_time
Action	Returncode

# *Showing Failed log-on attempts*

- Select count(\*), username, terminal, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY') from dba\_audit\_session where returncode<> 0 group by username, terminal, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY');

## Output

Number of failed attempts

Username

Terminal

Timestamp



# *Script to show connection attempts*

- Select count(\*), username, terminal, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY'), returncode from dba\_audit\_session group by username, terminal, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY');

## Output

Failed attempts

Successful attempts

Username

Terminal

Timestamp



# *Script to Show Connection Attempts with non-existent users*

- Select username, terminal, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY HH24:MI:SS') from dba\_audit\_session where returncode <> 0 and not exists (select 'x' from dba\_users where dba\_users.username=dba\_audit\_session.username)

## Output

Invalid usernames

Timestamps

Terminal



# *Script to detect attempts to access database at unusual hours*

- Select username, terminal, action\_name, returncode, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY HH24:MI:SS'), to\_char(logoff\_time, 'DD-MON-YYYY HH24:MI:SS') from dba\_audit\_session where to\_date (to\_char(timestamp, 'HH24:MI:SS'), 'HH24:MI:SS') < to\_date ('08:00:00', 'HH24:MM:SS') or to\_date (to\_char (timestamp, 'HH24:MI:SS'), 'HH24:MI:SS') < to\_date ('19:30:00', 'HH24:MM:SS')
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# *Script to detect attempts to access database at unusual hours*

## Output

Username

Terminal

Action

Returncode

Timestamp



# *Script to detect users accessing database from multiple locations*

- Select count (distinct(terminal)), username from dba\_audit\_session having count(distinct(terminal)) >1) group by username

Output

Username

Number of Terminals user connected from



# *Script to detect mutiple users accessing database from one locations*

- Select count (distinct(username)), terminal from dba\_audit\_session having count(distinct (username))>1) group by terminal

Output

Username

Number of accounts logged in to from this location





# *Script to detect objects being created or changed*

- Select username, priv\_used, obj\_name, to\_char(timestamp, 'DD-MON-YYYY HH24:MI') timestamp returncode from dba\_audit\_session where priv\_used is not null and priv\_used <> 'CREATE SESSION'

## Output

Username

Privelege used

Object accessed

Time

Return code

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# *What can this Basic audit policy tell us?*

- Potential abuse of the database
- Shared accounts
- Modification of objects



## *Other things Audit could do*

- Audit original/changed values for important tables
  - Payroll
  - Vacation time
- Audit attempts to view database
- Summarize results into another table to preserve results and truncate database table



# *Performance Suggestions*

- Do not index audit tables
- Put on separate disks or less used devices
- Put audit trail in its own table space
- Turn off triggers on bulk operations (massive adds/deletes)



# Misc

- What happens when the audit tablespace is full?
  - Trusted Oracle is supposed to stop processing
  - Regular Oracle will have issues
    - Any trigger that is fired that generates an audit will fail since the audit failed
- Rollbacks will also rollback the audit trail preventing the existence of non-existent audits
  - Good or Bad?

# *Where we Are*

- Audit trail plans are behind schedule
- Oracle twilight support for 8.0.x series has resulted in forced migration to 8i/9i series this year
- Enormous push back on auditing plans
- Have done basic experiments audits on test databases



# Summary

- Oracle offers an amazing amount of power in its auditing facilities
  - It is enough power to shoot yourself in the foot with a machine gun
  - Used carefully with an incrementally developed policy it can be a tremendous tool



# *Contact Info*

- The best way to contact me is via e-mail at [grothe@earthlink.net](mailto:grothe@earthlink.net)





# Resources

- Security Focus  
<http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1689>
  - Oracle Security Handbook by Marlene Theriault and William Henry O'Reilly Press 1998 ISBN 1-56592-450-9
  - Oracle Security step-by-step – A survival guide for Oracle Security Pete Finnigan 2003, published by SANS institute
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# Q & A

- Comments?

